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Abstract
Illegal immigration is a major policy challenge in Europe, in particular in countries on the
external border of the EU such as Italy or Spain. However, there are likely to be important
eects on the rest of the EU, too, depending on the policies against illegal immigration in
border countries. This paper determines optimal enforcement and amnesty policies on illegal
immigration in a federation with border and non-border countries. We show that in the Nash
equilibrium with positive enforcement spending in both countries, total enforcement spending
is too low to maximize joint welfare. We nd that in this case a side payment can be necessary
to achieve the cooperative optimum, depending on the relative size of populations in the two
countries.
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The ght against illegal immigration is on the forefront of the current political debate in the EU.
While it is dicult to come up with reliable data about the scope of illegal immigration, the
European Commission estimates that up to 6 million immigrants were residing illegally in the EU
as of 2005.1 The Mediterranean Sea is one of the main routes of illegal immigrants coming into
the EU, accounting for 100.000{120.000 migrants that cross this maritime border to the EU every
year (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). This is not only seen as a concern for the southern EU member
countries adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea but for the entire Union. A letter from eight leaders of
southern EU member states to the EU presidency in 2006 calls illegal immigration `a problem which
concerns the entirety of the Union and not only the countries on its external borders' (Cuschieri,
2007). Their view was conrmed by the German minister of the interior in 2007 who stated that
`(t)he citizens expect eective enforcement at the external border of the EU. And only collectively
... can we eectively ght illegal migration.'2
There are several policy tools for the host countries of illegal immigration to cope with this phe-
nomenon. Among the most common ones are border controls and deportation, but also the granting
of legal status to illegal aliens. The last option has gained particular importance over the last 20
years since countries like Spain and Italy have made repeated use of legalization or regularization
programs since 1980.3 Italy alone legalized around 1.5 million illegal aliens in the period from
1987{2002. The most recent amnesty program was implemented in 2005 by Spain, which granted
legal status and work permits to around 700,000 migrants.4
The amnesty measures in southern Europe spurred protest among fellow EU member states. Ger-
many and the Netherlands criticized Spain during a meeting of EU ministers of the interior for
acting arbitrarily and in an uncoordinated way, and phrased their concern about legalized immi-
grants entering other member states. In a similar manner, Austria and Switzerland `accused Italy
of turning a blind eye to would-be refugees heading north.'5 More recently, the then-EU presidency
1For detailed estimations see the database of the CLANDESTINO project funded by the European Commission
at http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net/. Note that estimates of the number of illegal immigrants are necessarily
imprecise. See Jandl (2004) for a critical assessment of dierent methods of estimation.
2Wolfgang Sch auble, German Minister of the Interior on 15 February 2007.
3The terms legalization and regularization are used interchangeably in the following, although there is a slight
dierence as pointed out by Papademetriou et al. (2004). While legalization comprises the granting of settlement
rights, regularization refers to the granting of work permits. Both can be given on a permanent or temporary basis.
Past amnesty programs in Europe encompassed legalization as well as regularization. For an overview see Krieger
and Minter (2007) and the literature cited therein.
4For a detailed representation of amnesty programs in Europe, see Papademetriou et al. (2004), Levinson (2005)
and ICMPD (2009).
5The Economist (September 6, 2001), cited in Facchini et al. (2006).
2led by France pushed towards a Europe-wide ban on regularization and amnesty programs for
illegal migrants. The proposal was rejected due to the intervention of Spain. These conicts of
interest are to be seen in the context of the broader EU policy of free movement of persons within
the common market. According to Schengen law6 (legalized) immigrants from third countries are
allowed to move freely within the European territory after a waiting period of 5 years. Due to the
option of migration within the EU, the legalizing country can expect at least some of its legalized
immigrants to leave the country after a short time, while fellow member states can expect some
immigration of migrants from the country of rst entry. While empirical evidence on the issue is
largely missing, at least according to Chiuri et al. (2007) the phenomenon of onward migration is
real and signicant: they show that among illegal immigrants in Italy around 23% expressed the
intention to move on to another country in Europe.7
The existing literature on immigration policy has only recently turned to the analysis of immi-
gration amnesties. The focus of the few existing contributions is on the causes for and the timing
of amnesty decisions. Epstein and Weiss (2001), for example, analyze the optimal timing of an
immigration amnesty in a dynamic setting given that the policymaker desires as little illegal immi-
grants as possible. Karlson and Katz (2003) assume that some illegal immigration is desirable and
show how the government can select the high-skilled among potential illegal immigrants by setting
up a mix of border control and amnesty provision. Chau (2001) considers the optimal policy mix
of employer sanctions and amnesties, while Hillman and Weiss (1999) and Garcia (2009) use a
political economy approach to explain amnesty policies.
All of these studies exclusively consider the policy perspective of a single host country that faces
an inux and a presence of illegal immigrants. In contrast, our approach focuses on a situation
where a host country of illegal immigrants is part of an economic union or a federation with free
movement within.8 In this situation, externalities arise between member states and generate a
number of interesting questions such as: What is the optimal amnesty decision of a country that
is part of a federation? What is the optimal policy response of other countries in the federation,
given this amnesty decision? How large is the optimal amount of spending on enforcement of the
external border in a federation, and how is the cost of this enforcement spending distributed? How
do amnesty and enforcement policies dier depending on whether or not countries cooperate to
maximize joint welfare? The last question is of particular importance for the EU at large as well
as for existing common institutions such as the EU Frontex agency, which was introduced in 2005.
6EU Directive 2003/109/EG.
7Of the 920 illegal immigrants in Italy who were surveyed, 10% stated Germany and 5% stated France as their
intended nal destination.
8Fenge and Meier (2006) apply interregional transfers as a migration deterrent mechanism in a federal setting
with a rich and a poor country but do not consider illegal migration or amnesty policy.
3Frontex is nanced by joint contributions of EU member states and supports the enforcement of
the external EU border.9 Our model goes, however, beyond a standard scal federalism analysis
because of an asymmetry of policy instruments between the countries involved. Thus, besides the
externalities between member states, the interaction between enforcement and amnesty policies is
important in the model.
In our model, we capture the stylized facts as described above in a model of a federation that
consists of two countries, one located at the external border of the federation and one within the
border. Illegal immigrants get into the `port-of-entry' country on the external border, unless they
are deterred by costly border enforcement. Alternatively, undesirable illegal immigration can be
reduced by an amnesty, which aects both the costs of illegal immigration and the distribution
of these costs between member states. Here, the rate of onward migration of legalized migrants
due to free mobility between member states is important. With onward migration, the country
of nal destination is negatively aected by an amnesty in the port-of-entry country, but it can
aect the amnesty and enforcement spending decisions through co-nancing border enforcement.
In our model, we rst determine the policy outcome with strategic behavior of member states in a
federation like the EU and then compare it to the optimal cooperative policy on illegal immigration.
As a result, we determine the Nash equilibria of the decisions on amnesty and enforcement spending
in the two countries. We nd that enforcement spending in the border country is always greater
than or equal to enforcement spending within the border. A greater rate of onward migration
within the federation makes an amnesty more likely; given that there is an amnesty, greater onward
migration decreases enforcement spending in the border country (ceteris paribus) and increases it
within the border. Further, we nd that in a situation with positive enforcement spending in both
countries, enforcement spending is too low to maximize joint welfare, and a side payment from one
of the two countries to the other might be necessary to achieve the cooperative equilibrium. In an
extension, we consider endogenous onward migration of legalized migrants within the federation
and show that results from the basic model remain qualitatively unchanged. We also nd that a
Coasian bargaining solution exists for an ecient rule on onward migration of immigrants within
the federation, which either restricts migration to zero or allows free migration.
Our paper is organized as follows. We rst introduce the two-country framework and the timing of
events in Section 2. In Section 3, we determine the optimal decisions on enforcement spending and
the granting of an amnesty in non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium. In Section 4, we show how the
cooperative equilibrium compares to the non-cooperative equilibrium. In Section 5 we present the
case where onward migration of legalized migrants is either endogenous or the outcome of Coasian
bargaining between countries in the federation. Section 6 concludes.
9More details on the origin, tasks and activities of Frontex can be found in Jorry (2007) and Carrera (2007).
42 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
There are two countries in a federation: country A, which is situated at the external border of the
federation and country B, which is not. There is illegal immigration from outside the federation and
free migration within the federation for immigrants who have been legalized. Due to its geographic
location, any illegal immigrants from outside the federation have to pass through country A in
order to arrive at country B. A detailed discussion of the timing of events follows in the section
below.
In each country, a single consumption good is produced only from labor input, which is homo-
geneous and supplied inelastically. Wages wA and wB in the two countries are determined by
country-specic labor productivity AA, AB and labor supply LA, LB. We consider an economy
with perfect competition, wages are expressed in units of the consumption good and are equal to
the marginal product of one unit of labor. Labor is provided by native workers and legal migrants
only. Following the segmentation hypothesis, we assume { but do not explicitly model { that illegal
immigrants work in a specic sector or part of the labor market (for example in particular jobs in
the agricultural or services sectors).10 As a consequence, illegal immigrants do not exert a nega-
tive wage eect on the native population in the regular labor market unless they are legalized (see
Cohen-Goldner and Paserman, 2004, for a justication).11 Neither natives nor legalized immigrants
choose to work in the illegal sectors due to poor working conditions. Wages are suciently high
in the illegal sector compared to wages outside the federation that there is a potentially unlimited
supply of immigrants.
The governments in countries A and B redistribute income by levying a at rate income tax tA
10There is some academic debate about the question of whether immigrants and natives tend to be substitutes
in the labor market or whether they work on dierent labor markets (see Martin, 1988; Greenwood and McDowell,
1986; and Winegarden and Khor, 1991, for discussions). Recent theoretical models on illegal immigration tend to
take the latter view (see, e.g., Carter, 1999, 2005; Hillman and Weiss, 1999; or Djaji c, 1997). There is some empirical
evidence pointing in this direction as well (see, e.g., Greenwood and McDowell, 1986; Massey, 1987; Card, 1990;
Winegarden and Khor, 1991; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Chiswick, 1988a,b).
11There is little empirical evidence for negative wage eects of illegal immigration on natives (see, e.g., Winegarden
and Khor, 1991; Hanson et al., 2002). After legalization, illegal immigrants were found to move into urban jobs with
more stability and higher wages in Taylor (1987). Carrasco et al. (2008) nd `weak' evidence for legalized immigrants
to be better substitutes for native workers than illegal immigrants, thus exerting a relatively stronger negative wage
eect on natives (even though a potentially biased estimator has to be taken into account). Fakiolas (1999) reports
similar evidence from Greece, arguing that illegal immigrants have to acquire country-specic knowledge before
they can compete with natives on the labor market, which may coincide with the time of legalization. Orrenius and
Zavodny (2007) indicate that immigrants adjusting their immigration status within the U.S., but not newly arriving
immigrants, have a signicant negative impact on the wages of low-skilled natives.
5and tB and spending the resulting tax revenue lump-sum via a benet bA and bB, respectively. We
assume that the governments' budgets must be balanced. Natives and legal immigrants are treated
alike scally: the tax revenue from the income tax 0  ti  1 levied on labor income of both natives
and legal immigrants is redistributed evenly through the lump-sum benet bi, i 2 fA;Bg, which
is granted to natives as well as legal immigrants. Illegal immigrants do not pay taxes but receive
a benet (see below).
2.2 Timing of Events
In the following, we determine optimal policies in the presence of illegal immigration that is costly
because of the benet that accrues to illegals. There are two potential policies: i) to reduce the
number of illegals by spending part of the tax revenue on border enforcement or ii) to legalize illegal
immigrants by granting an amnesty. In the latter case, the immigrants earn wages and contribute
to the tax revenue.
Immigrants have a harder time getting into country B than into country A due to its geographic
location, and we assume that only country A faces illegal immigration for simplicity. Enforcement,
therefore, is only possible at the federation's external border in country A. Immigrants can move
on to country B once they are legalized due to a right for free movement within the federation.12
While country A determines both the optimal amount of its enforcement spending eA as well as
the optimal amnesty a, country B can contribute to total enforcement spending in the form of a
subsidy eB to country A.
Events are as follows:
1. There is illegal immigration M into country A, which can be reduced by enforcement spending
in country A: @M
@eA < 0.
2. Country A decides on the optimal amount that it spends on enforcement, eA, and on whether
to grant an amnesty or not, given illegal immigration, a 2 0;1. The optimal amount of
enforcement spending eA will depend on the amnesty and on the enforcement subsidy from
country B: eA(a;eB).
3. Once they are legalized, immigrants can move on to country B. They do so at a rate , which
we assume to be given for now.
4. Country B decides on the optimal amount of enforcement spending eB that it transfers to
country A as a subsidy. This amount will depend on the amnesty and enforcement spending
in country A: eB(eA;a).
12We assume that illegal immigrants in country A do not move to country B as the wage gain relative to high
migration costs in the form of fear of detection and deportation is negligible.
6All of the decisions above are taken simultaneously. Every player in the game (country A, country
B) has perfect and complete information. Country A takes into account the response of country
B (4) in its decision on enforcement and amnesty (2), and vice versa. In the following analysis, we
solve for the Nash equilibria of the amnesty, the enforcement subsidy in country B and enforcement
spending in country A.
3 Optimal Amnesty and Enforcement Spending
In this section, we rst solve for the optimal amnesty and enforcement in country A and then
for the optimal enforcement subsidy of country B. After that, we determine the equilibrium when
countries behave non-cooperatively. In the next section, we consider the cooperative equilibrium
and show how it compares with the non-cooperative outcome.
3.1 Migration
Illegal immigration into country A from outside the federation is given by M. Once illegal immi-
grants are in country A, they are either legalized (a = 1) or they stay illegal (a = 0). Further, if
they are legalized, they can stay in country A or move on to country B at a rate 0 <  < 1. The
stock of migrants in the two countries is therefore given by the sum of illegal migrants and legal
migrants who stay in country A:
MA = (1   a)M + (1   )aM (1)
and legalized migrants who move on to country B:
MB = aM: (2)
Legal and illegal immigrants dier in their eects on the wage, tax revenue and per capita benet
in each country, as will be seen below. While legal migrants do not only receive the benet but
also contribute to tax revenue and put pressure on the wage, illegal migrants also receive (at least
part of) the benet,13 but have { according to the segmentation hypothesis { no eect on the tax
revenue or wage.
We assume that illegal immigration can be reduced by enforcement spending. While it would also
be plausible to assume that (future) illegal immigration increases with an amnesty,14 this would
13This serves to make illegal immigration costly. It does not matter for the results qualitatively whether migrants
receive the full benet or only part of it. For simplicity, we assume illegal immigrants receive the full benet in the
following.
14See for example Chau (2001).
7only make an amnesty less likely in our model but not aect results otherwise (see below). Therefore
we assume for simplicity that illegal immigration is not aected by the amnesty decision in country
A.
3.2 Production
In each country i, i 2 fA;Bg rms produce a private good with labor Li as the only factor of
production. Labor is supplied inelastically and is fully employed. The relevant total labor supply
consists of natives and legal migrants, i.e., all workers in the legal sector:
LA = NA + (1   )aM, (3)
LB = NB + aM. (4)
In country A there also exists an illegal sector where the (1 a)M illegal migrants work. We assume
that neither income nor rents generated in the illegal sector aect the regular labor force or total
output.15 Then, total output in each country is given by
Yi = AiL

i ; i 2 fA;Bg; 0 <  < 1, (5)
where Ai is a measure of technology in country i. Due to perfect competition the wage in each
country equals the marginal product of labor, which is decreasing in the supply of labor:
wA = AA
1
(NA + (1   a)M)1  (6)
wB = AB
1
(NB + aM)1  (7)
3.3 Country A: Optimal Amnesty
To determine the optimal amount of enforcement spending eA in country A, we maximize individual
utility, which we assume to be equal to net income plus the lump-sum benet:
UA = wA(1   tA) + bA: (8)
15The rst part of this assumption follows from the segmentation hypothesis, the second part relates to the
specication of the production function. One can simply assume that rents from the illegal sector accrue to foreigners
only.
8The government budget constraint requires that total tax revenue plus the enforcement subsidy
from country B equals total benets plus enforcement spending:
tAwA(NA + (1   )aM) + eB = eA + bA(NA + (1   a)M + (1   )aM): (9)
Only legalized immigrants who stay in country A pay taxes, but both legal immigrants who stay
and illegal immigrants receive the benet bA. In addition to tax revenue, country A receives the
enforcement subsidy eB from country B.
In order to determine whether country A will grant an amnesty or not, we substitute for bA using
(9) and compare utility (8) for the case of an amnesty a = 1 with the case of no amnesty a = 0.
Lemma 1. Country A grants an amnesty, if utility is higher with than without an amnesty. It does






























(eA   eB) ja=1
1
NA + (1   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We assume that country A will grant an amnesty, if utility stays the same. An amnesty has an eect
on both the net wage as well as the per capita benet. First, it reduces the net wage via an increase
in labor supply (rst term on the right-hand side of (11)). Second, it increases the benet derived
from tax revenue, as tax revenue increases and the number of recipients decreases, because some of
the formerly illegal immigrants are now legalized and move on to country B (second term). Finally,
an amnesty increases per capita enforcement spending net of the enforcement subsidy eA   eB,
as the number of those who bear the cost via a reduction in their benet decreases (third and
forth terms).16 However, enforcement spending in both countries in turn depends on the amnesty
decision as follows.
3.4 Country A: Optimal Enforcement Spending
To determine optimal enforcement spending in country A, we substitute in utility (8) for the benet
bA using (9) and for the wage wA using (6) and derive the rst-order condition for enforcement
16Note that an amnesty could also increase illegal immigration M. As illegal immigration is costly, this would






 AA(1   )(1   tA)(1   )a(N + (1   )aM) (2 )
+AA2tA(1   )a(N + (1   )aM) (1 )(N + (1   a)M) 1
 (AAtA(N + (1   )aM) + eB   eA)(1   a)(N + (1   a)M) 2 @M
@eA
 (N + (1   a)M) 1 = 0: (12)
Just as the amnesty, enforcement spending has an eect on the wage and on tax revenue. The only
dierence is the sign: as enforcement decreases the number of immigrants, it decreases the negative
wage eect (rst term on the right-hand side of (12)) as well as the positive tax revenue eect
(second term) of immigration. In addition, it also decreases the negative eect of immigration on
the per capita benet bA for given tax revenue (third term) and has a marginal cost (fourth term).
The optimal amount of enforcement spending depends on how eective it is in deterring illegal
immigration. For simplicity, we will assume that enforcement spending decreases illegal immigration
one-to-one: @M
@eA =  1. We solve (12) for eA to get optimal enforcement spending as a function of
the enforcement subsidy eB and the amnesty a.







A   (NA + M) if a = 0





if a = 1,
(13)
given eA > 0. eA = 0 otherwise.
Enforcement spending in country A increases by the amount of enforcement subsidy from country
B as long as eA > 0.
3.5 Country B: Optimal Enforcement Subsidy
As before, we determine the optimal amount of the enforcement subsidy eB in country B by
maximizing individual utility
UB = wB(1   tB) + bB: (14)
The government budget constraint requires that total tax revenue equals total benets plus the
enforcement subsidy:
tBwB(NB + aM) = bB(NB + aM) + eB: (15)
Immigrants who were legalized in country A and moved on to country B contribute to the tax
revenue and receive a per capita benet in the same way as natives.
10Substituting for the benet bB in (14) using (15) and for the wage wB using (7), and dierentiating
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  (NB + aM) 1 = 0:
(16)
An enforcement subsidy eB has four dierent eects on individual utility in country B. First, it
decreases the negative marginal wage eect of immigration and, second, it decreases the positive
marginal eect of immigration on tax revenue via an increase in enforcement spending eA and
the resulting decrease of illegal immigration M. The net eect on the wage and tax revenue is
given by the rst term on the right-hand side of (16). It is positive if tB > (1   tB)(1   ) and
negative otherwise. Third, the subsidy decreases the negative marginal eect of immigration on the
lump-sum benet bB, which is given by the second term in (16),17 via the increase in enforcement
spending eA and the decrease of illegal immigration M. Finally, the subsidy has a marginal cost
given by the third term in (16). Solution of the rst-order condition (16) leads to the following
optimal enforcement subsidy of country B as a function of eA and a.





0 if either @eA
@eB = 0 or a = 0







given eB > 0. eB = 0 otherwise.
The marginal benet of the subsidy as expressed in the square brackets in (16) depends on the
extent to which the subsidy translates into higher actual enforcement spending in country A. For
example, the benet is negative if country A does not spend more on enforcement as a result of
the subsidy: @eA
@eB = 0. As a result, the optimal subsidy is equal to zero. We determine the optimal
subsidy for the two cases of i) @eA
@eB = 0 and ii) @eA
@eB = 1, as these are the two relevant cases,
according to (13). The marginal benet of the subsidy is also negative, if there is no amnesty in
country A: a = 0. Then, the optimal subsidy is also equal to zero.
3.6 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
Denition 1. An equilibrium is a vector (a;e
A;e
B) such that i) a is the choice of amnesty in
country A, given e
A and e
B, ii) e
A is the choice of enforcement spending in country A, given a,
e
B and iii) e
B is the choice of enforcement subsidy in country B, given a, e
A.
17Note that b =
ABtB(NB+aM) eB
NB+aM according to (15).
11The optimal amnesty depends on enforcement spending in country A and B according to (10).
Both optimal enforcement spending in country A and the optimal enforcement subsidy in country
B depend on the amnesty granted in A, according to (13) and (17). In addition, eA in turn depends
on eB and vice versa, as can be seen in (13) and (17). For the solution (a,e
A,e
B) to be a Nash
equilibrium, each variable has to be the best response to the other two.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the optimal amnesty a is equal to 0 or 1 according to the conditions
stated in Appendix A. Depending on the amnesty decision, optimal enforcement spending e
A and
e
B in countries A and B are equal to the following.






A   (NA + M),
if e
A > 0. (a;e
B;e
A) = (0;0;0) otherwise.
For a = 1,
e









B > 0 and e








B according to the paragraph above  0 and e
A > 0. (a;e
B;e
A) = (1;0;0) otherwise.
Proof. If there is no amnesty, country B does not pay any subsidy because it is not aected
by immigration. Then, country A pays for enforcement, if its marginal benet in the form of an




(NA+M)2 is greater than the direct marginal cost of enforcement
1
NA+M.
If there is an amnesty, country B pays a subsidy, if the marginal benets in the form of an increase
in the per capita benet and an increase in the wage are greater than the marginal costs in the
form of the direct cost and a decrease in tax revenue, respectively. Likewise, country A pays for
enforcement, if the subsidy from country B plus the aforementioned marginal benets are greater
than the aforementioned marginal costs. Enforcement spending in A increases in the subsidy from
B because the subsidy adds to the public revenue in A that can be distributed in the form of the
per capita benet, which in turn increases the marginal benet of enforcement for A.
12Corollary 1. An amnesty in country A becomes more likely with an increase in the rate of onward
migration .
The utility gain from an amnesty increases in the migration rate . This is because income in case
of an amnesty increases with  due to a positive eect on both the net wage and the per capita
benet, as the population (and, therefore, labor supply) decreases.18
Corollary 2. Given that there is an amnesty, enforcement spending decreases in country A (for
given enforcement subsidy from country B), and increases in country B with an increase in the rate
of onward migration .
An increase in the share of migrants who move from country A to country B decreases the marginal
benet of enforcement relative to the marginal cost in country A, and it increases the marginal
benet of enforcement relative to the marginal cost in country B. Therefore, enforcement (net of
the subsidy) decreases with  in A and increases in B.
Corollary 3. An increase in the factors of technology AA and AB increases any positive enforce-
ment spending in country A and country B, respectively, for any given amnesty regime.
The negative eects of immigration on the wage and the per capita benet as well as the positive
eect on tax revenue all increase with labor productivity. As the negative eects increase more
strongly than the positive eect, enforcement spending increases.
4 Cooperative Equilibrium
Next, we determine the eciency of each country's decision on enforcement spending for the fed-
eration overall. To this end, we determine whether a policy change on enforcement spending by
country A or country B could increase the joint welfare of both countries, which we assume to be
given by the simple utilitarian welfare function
W = UANA + UBNB: (18)
We analyze the overall eciency of enforcement spending for each of the two possible amnesty
regimes in country A.19
18Income does not change with  in the case of no amnesty.
19The overall eciency of the amnesty policy in country A depends on parameter values. A given amnesty regime
is inecient for the federation, if a regime change would result in a welfare loss in country A, UA(a = 1) UA(a = 0)
(given by (27)-(30)), that is smaller than any analogous welfare gain in country B, UB(a = 1)   UB(a = 0), and it
is ecient otherwise. The joint welfare eect depends on the values of tax rates and productivity and population
levels in the two countries, as well as on the size of illegal immigration and the rate of onward migration from A to
B.















(NB + aM)2  ((1   tB)(1   )   tB) +
(ABtB(NB + aM)   eB)a
(NB + aM)2 : (20)
As enforcement spending in A reduces illegal immigration M, it has the same eects on utility
in country B as the enforcement subsidy eB (without the cost): a positive eect on the wage, a
positive eect on the per capita benet for given tax revenue (as the number of recipients decreases)
and a negative eect on the benet for a given number of recipients (as tax revenue decreases). If
there is no amnesty (a = 0) or no onward migration ( = 0), there is no eect of immigration and,
therefore, no eect of enforcement spending eA on country B. In this simple case, the individually
ecient level of eA is just equal to the ecient level overall.
More interesting is the case where both countries are aected by immigration, and enforcement
spending in country A has an external eect on country B, and vice versa. Therefore, we assume
in the following that there is an amnesty in country A and strictly positive onward migration from
country A to country B.
Proposition 2. The cooperative level of enforcement spending in A is greater than any positive
Nash spending e
A > 0. Likewise, the cooperative level of the enforcement subsidy from B is greater
than any positive Nash subsidy e
B > 0.
Proof. According to (20), @UB
@eA > 0 i
eB < AB(1   )(NB + M):
Substituting for eB using the Nash equilibrium values of the enforcement subsidy according to
Proposition 1, we nd that the condition above is always fullled.20 In other words, the cost of
immigration for country B via a decrease in the wage and in the per capita benet (for given
tax revenue) always exceeds the benet of immigration via an increase in tax revenue. Therefore,
country B gains from increased enforcement in country A. As @UA
@eA = 0 at any strictly positive Nash
equilibrium e
A > 0, the marginal welfare eect @W
@eA according to (19) is positive.21 The maximum
welfare W is achieved at a level eA that is higher than the level chosen by country A.
20It is also easy to see that
@UB
@eB > 0 is sucient for
@UB
@eA > 0 by comparing (20) with (16).
21Note that if the Nash equilibrium level of eA is zero, the marginal eect for country A
@UA
@eA is negative, and the
total marginal eect depends on parameter values.
14Analogously, we determine the marginal eect of enforcement spending in country B, eB, on joint















NA + (1   a)M
; (22)
which is strictly positive, while @UB
@eB = 0 at any strictly positive Nash equilibrium e
B > 0.

From the results derived above, we can conclude that an increase in any positive non-cooperative
equilibrium levels of enforcement spending in A and enforcement spending in B can increase joint
welfare in the federation. However, the maximization of joint welfare in cooperative equilibrium
may not result in an increase in welfare for both countries. For example, the welfare loss in A from
an increase in eA might exceed the welfare gain in A from an increase in eB. As a consequence, a
side payment would be necessary from country B to country A to induce an increase in enforcement
spending in both countries to the cooperative level.
Proposition 3. Assume there is an amnesty and a positive enforcement subsidy in country B.




Proof. Take the Nash equilibrium with a = 1 and eB > 0. According to (22), the total marginal





NA + (1   )M
;
which is constant in eB. In contrast, the total marginal welfare loss in A from an increase in
enforcement spending eA from the Nash level to the cooperative level increases linearly from zero
to some value equal to @UB






at the Nash level, and increasing in eA
22, the total marginal welfare loss in A from an increase in




22Note that M is a decreasing function of eA.
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The welfare gain in A from an increase in the subsidy eB is achieved via an increase in the per capita
benet in A for natives. Similarly, the welfare gain in B (and, therefore, the equivalent marginal
loss in A) from an increase in eA is achieved via an increase in the native per capita benet in B.
As a result, the net gain in A is smaller, the smaller the native population in A relative to B and
the smaller the rate of onward migration .23
5 Extensions
5.1 Endogenous Onward Migration
So far, we have assumed that illegal immigration M and the rate of onward migration  are
given. However, migration is likely to increase in the income dierentials that are to be gained
from moving. In turn, these dierentials will decrease with migration. Arbitrage via migration will
therefore reduce any given income dierential,24 if the cost of migration is not too large. While
we can argue that the migration cost from outside the federation is large enough for the eect
of marginal changes in income on illegal immigration M to be negligible, the eect on onward
migration  might be more substantial. In the following, we therefore model the rate of migration
 from country A to country B as a function of the dierence in income between the two countries.
We assume that with an amnesty, immigrants in country A gain the right to move freely within the
federation immediately.25 They can choose whether to stay in country A or migrate on to country
B. Their incentive to do so is assumed to depend on the dierence in net wages plus per capita
benets that is to be gained by moving from A to B as well as their individual cost of migration.26
23Of course, a scenario where A has to pay a side payment to B is also possible. However, as the marginal gain
in B is increasing in eA, we can only derive a lower limit for the total gain in B and derive a sucient condition for
the payment from A to B not to be necessary to achieve cooperative equilibrium.
24For simplicity, here { and elsewhere in the paper { we exclude the possibility that natives of the federation
migrate as to take advantage of income dierentials within the federation. Allowing for natives' arbitrage would
weaken the eect on , but not qualitatively change our results. Our simplifying assumption may be justied
by very low migration rates within the European Union (only 4% of all EU citizens have ever settled { at least
temporarily { in another EU member state; see Eurobarometer, 2006) despite persisting income dierentials. This
stylized fact is usually explained by a strong attachment-to-home (see, e.g., Mansoorian and Myers, 1993) which
implies particularly high migration costs, especially in comparison to migrants coming from outside the EU for
whom the main migration costs have already occured when { illegally { entering the Union.
25Within the EU, immigrants typically gain the right of free movement only with delay, i.e. after having resided
in an EU member state for a minimum of 5 years.
26For example, immigrants who have been in country A longer than others might have a higher cost of onward
migration.
165.1.1 The Migration Decision
Let i 2 (0; c) denote the individual migration cost that is required by legal immigrant i to move to
country B. We assume that legal immigrants in A are uniformly distributed with respect to their
migration cost i. An immigrant chooses to move to country B, if the income dierential is large
enough to cover her migration cost (UB  UA > i) and stays in country A otherwise. Denote any
given income dierential by
  UB   UA. (23)
Since all legal immigrants with migration cost i <  choose to move to country B,  gives the
number of legal immigrants in country A choosing to move. Setting  c = 1, we can express their
number as a share. Then, the rate of onward migration equals27
 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  < 0




 = [wB(1   tB) + bB]   [wA(1   tA) + bA] (25)
according to (23) together with (8) and (14).
If income is lower in country B than in country A, then migrants will incur an income loss in
addition to the migration cost when moving. As a consequence, none of them will move. If income
is higher in B than in A and the income gain is large enough to compensate migrants for their
migration cost, they move to B. If the income gain is not large enough, they stay in A.




(NB + aM)1    AA

1   tA
(NA + (1   )aM)1  +
tA(NA + (1   )aM)







NA + (1   a)M
. (26)
The income dierential and, in consequence, the rate of onward migration  depend on the amnesty
and on enforcement spending in both countries according to (26). In particular, migration increases
in enforcement spending eA and decreases in the enforcement subsidy eB as the former (latter)
reduces the per capita benet to be gained in country A (B).
27Note that we substitute for  c = 1 in 
 c .
175.1.2 Equilibrium
Denition 2. An equilibrium with endogenous migration  is a vector (a;e
A;e
B;) such that i)
a is the choice of amnesty in country A, given e
A, e
B and , ii) e
A is the choice of enforcement
spending in country A, given a, e
B and , iii) e
B is the choice of enforcement subsidy in country
B, given a, e
A and  and iv)  is the rate of migration, given a, e
A and e
B.
The rate of migration  depends on the amnesty and enforcement decisions according to (24)
together with (26), while the optimal amnesty and enforcement spending in country A and B
depend on each other and on the rate of migration according to (10), (13) and (17). For the
solution (a, e
A, e
B, ) to be a Nash equilibrium, each variable has to be the best response to the
other three.
Proposition 4. With an endogenous rate of migration , there can be multiple Nash equilibria
(a, e
A, e
B, ), a unique Nash equilibrium or none at all.
Proof. See Appendix B.
With endogenous onward migration , there can now be more than one Nash equilibrium for a
given set of parameter values, or none at all. While the solution thus gets more complicated, the
essential ndings from the case with given  (compare Corollaries 1-3) do not change.
5.2 The Policy Choice on Onward Migration
Of course, the countries within the federation may choose to restrict any migration rate  that
arises endogenously as migrants move to maximize their income. In the following, we determine the
optimal rate of migration for both countries A and B and derive the outcome of Coasian bargaining
over the migration rate between the two countries.
We only consider the case where   ~  such that a = 1 according to the proof to Proposition 4. If
 < ~ , then there is no amnesty and no legal migrants who could move.
Lemma 4. Assume   ~  such that the optimal amnesty decision is a = 1 and migration from
country A to country B is possible. Then, the optimal rate of migration for country A is  = 1.
The optimal rate of migration for country B is  = 0.
Proof.
According to the expression for utility in country A (8) together with wage (6), benet (9) and
amnesty and enforcement spending according to Proposition 4, marginal utility in A with respect
to migration is positive: @UA
@ > 0. Analogously, (14) together with (7), (15) and Proposition 2
shows that marginal utility in B with respect to migration is negative: @UB
@ < 0. See Appendix C.
18An increase in the share of legal migrants who move from country A to country B decreases the
population in A and, therefore, increases the net wage and the per capita benet in A. It increases
the population in B, where it decreases the net wage and the per capita benet. As a result, utility
in A increases, whereas utility in B decreases, and the optimal rate of migration for country A (B)
is equal to one (zero).

Lemma 5. As an outcome of Coasian bargaining over the migration rate, countries A and B will
either restrict migration to zero or allow free migration.
Proof.
The marginal gain from migration  in country A is increasing in , while the marginal cost from
 in country B is decreasing (see Appendix C). Denote the equilibrium rate of free migration
according to Proposition 4 as . Then, for any 0 <  < , it is true that either i) country B can
compensate country A for a reduction of  to zero, or ii) country A can compensate country B for
a rise of  to . Whether the bargaining outcome will be zero or free migration depends on the
size of the gain from free migration for country A relative to the size of the loss for country B.

Corollary 5. Coasian bargaining over the migration regime between country A and B is more
likely to result in free migration, i) the greater the factor of technology in country A, AA and ii)
the smaller the factor of technology in country B, AB.
The gain from free migration in A is increasing in AA, while the loss from free migration in B is
increasing in AB. This is because the negative eect of legalized migrants on the net wage and the
per capita benet increases in the factor of technology in both countries (compare Corollary 2).
6 Conclusion
Illegal immigration is a persistent and growing phenomenon despite enhanced eorts of destination
countries to tighten their borders. As not all illegal immigrants can be deterred by enforcement
policies, amnesties become a policy option with regard to illegals already in the country. Within
the EU, the policy on illegal immigration has remained rather uncoordinated so far, even though
it has been recognized that cooperation on the issue is highly needed. In a federation with free
movement of persons such as the EU, the policies on illegal immigration in one country can cause
important externalities in another country. This has become apparent in recent conicts between
19EU member countries concerning the distribution of the costs of enforcement of the EU border
and the amnesty policies of countries on the border such as Italy and Spain.
In this paper, we consider the external eects of the policies on enforcement spending and amnesty
in a federation where illegals can move freely once they are legalized. In a game-theoretic setting,
we determine the optimal amnesty and enforcement spending in a border country as well as the
optimal enforcement subsidy of a country within the border of the federation. We determine the
Nash equilibria on amnesty and enforcement, and show that enforcement spending in the border
country is always greater than or equal to enforcement within the border. The distribution of
enforcement spending crucially depends on the rate of onward migration of legalized migrants
within the federation.
Further, we nd that in non-cooperative equilibrium with positive enforcement spending in both
countries, total enforcement spending is too low to maximize joint welfare. In this case, a side
payment can be necessary to achieve the cooperative optimum, depending on the relative size of
populations in the two countries. Coasian bargaining between countries can also achieve an ecient
policy on amnesties or on the movement of legalized migrants within the federation.
Our paper contributes to the current quest for suitable policies in Europe with respect to the
growing number of illegal immigrants. We show that important externalities arise from single
country policies on illegal immigration and that there is scope for cooperation that would improve
the eciency of such policies. Recent initiatives like the common European border agency Frontex
are a rst step in this direction.
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237 Appendix
A. The amnesty decision in Proposition 1
The amnesty decision of country A depends on whether utility is greater with or without an
amnesty according to (11). Substituting for eA and eB using (13) and (17), we can distinguish
four dierent conditions for the optimal amnesty to be equal to zero or one according to whether
enforcement spending in country A is positive or zero in each amnesty regime.















































  1  0
0 otherwise,
(29)




















B. Equilibria with endogenous migration in Proposition 4









A   (NA + M)
 = 1,








24if 2 < ~ ,
a = 1
e
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3  ~ , e










if 4  ~  and e







if 5  ~ ,
where ~  is the solution to UA ja=1= UA ja=0 according to (27)-(30), and



























3 is the solution to
3 =
AB2
(NB + 3M)1   
AA2




4 is the solution to
4 =
AB
(NB + 4M)1   
AA2




and 5 is the solution to
5 =
AB
(NB + 5M)1   
AA(1   2tA)
(NA + (1   5)M)1  ,
25if 3 2 [0;1], 4 2 [0;1] and 5 2 [0;1]. 3 = 0, 4 = 0, 5 = 0, if the solution is smaller than zero,
and 3 = 1, 4 = 1 , 5 = 1, if the solution is greater than 1, respectively.
There is no Nash equilibrium otherwise.
Proof.
The endogenous migration rate  is equal to the income dierential  for 0    1 according to
(24), which according to (26) and Proposition 1 is equal to the following:





























if a = 1, eB > 0, eA > 0:
 =
AB2
(NB + M)1   
AA2




if a = 1, eB = 0, eA > 0:
 =
AB
(NB + M)1   
AA2




if a = 1, eB = 0, eA = 0:
 =
AB
(NB + M)1   
AA(1   2tA)
(NA + (1   )M)1  ;
with eB and eA given by Proposition 1.
Country A decides for or against an amnesty depending on whether income is greater with or
without an amnesty according to (10). The utility gain from an amnesty is increasing in the
migration rate  (compare Corollary 1). We can therefore rewrite the amnesty decision as a function





1 if   ~ 
0 if  < ~ ,
(31)
where ~  is equal to the rate of migration at which country A is just indierent between an amnesty
or no amnesty according to (27)-(30).

26C. Utility with endogenous migration in Lemmas 4 and 5









1  if eA > 0
AA
(NA+(1 )M)1  if eA = 0
(32)








 if eB > 0
AB
(NB+M)1  if eB = 0
(33)
where eA and eB are as given in Appendix B.
From (32) it follows that @UA
@ > 0 and @
2UA
@2 > 0. From (33) it follows that @UB
@ < 0 and @
2UB
@2 > 0.
27